This paper studies and connects market organization and activity in the US collateralized interbank market using an assumption-neutral approach. We apply cluster analysis to aggregate activity factors suggested by prior studies to support two market organizations: three-tier and core-periphery. We fi nd that four bankspecifi c factors and one economic conditions factor explain interbank activity for both alternative organizations. We also fi nd evidence that the interbank market organization affects institutions' borrowing and lending. While both organizations moderate interbank activity, the three-tier structure detects distinct market operations which are not represented in the core-periphery structure.
Introduction
The interbank market links financial intermediaries by a sophisticated network of multilateral exposures where risky activities of some institutions are financed using borrowed funds. Specifically, small financial intermediaries use customer deposits to make loans to large universal intermediaries that depend on wholesale short-term funds to finance a gamut of risky activities. While individually these exposures may appear safe, it is important to understand the drivers of this activity and how these risks behave in aggregate (Allen and Gale, 2000; AlSuwailem, 2014) . As financial asset values fall, financial institutions experience difficulty in repaying current obligations, raising funds, and remaining solvent and liquid. Through failed obligations in both collateralized (repo) and uncollateralized (federal funds) interbank market, distress and losses can be transmitted across institutions, markets, and economic sectors (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Iyer and Peydro, 2011; Tedeschi et al., 2012) . Indeed, after the Lehman bankruptcy, repo haircuts ballooned some 43% (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) and the market retreated from $5.5 trillion in 2007 to $3.9 trillion in 2014 (Copeland et al., 2012; 2014) .
Studies of interbank market organization generally focus on a set of rules which classify banks according to the individual trades they make. The interbank market organization that results is subject to the trading rules used for classification (Bech and Atalay, 2010; Craig and von Peter, 2014) . A second strand of research seeks to shed light on the determinants of interbank market activity (e.g. King, 2008; Ashcraft et al., 2011) . This paper connects these two strands of literature by completing an empirical study of interbank market organization and leveraging the results to understand the drivers of interbank activity. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our research data and methods. Section 3 proposes falsifiable hypotheses regarding the organization of the interbank market and the principal functions of bank intermediaries relying on this market. The results in Section 4 identify market organization and connect it to the interbank activities. The discussion in Section 5 concludes.
We contribute three main findings. First, we find competing evidence of two alternative organizations of the US collateralized interbank market: core-periphery and three-tier. Second, we find that for both alternative organizations, interbank activities are associated with two exogenous factors-(1) economic conditions, (2) change in liquidity-and further mediated by three endogenous factors of institutional performance-(3) change in leverage, (4) change in return, and (5) balance sheet growth. Third, we demonstrate that the moderating effect of market organization on interbank activity results in different behavior between the tiers. In particular, we find that the three-tier partition marginally outperforms the core-periphery partition in explaining the variance in the US interbank market activity.
Research design

Data
The dataset consists of balance sheets drawn from the quarterly Federal Reserve Call Reports (031 and 041) between 3/31/1992 and 6/30/2014, supplemented by economic and monetary policy series from the Board of Governors releases (H.6 and H.15) 
and Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED). We select the top 100 US bank holding companies (BHCs) by total assets as of June 30, 2014 (aggregated to the bank holding company level). For this sample, the 22-year dataset comprises a 30-item measurement scale composed of quarterly data on the net interbank activities, institutional balance sheet stocks and flows, and macroeconomic conditions.
There are seven series we associate with the change in liquidity-change and growth in cash to liabilities, change and growth in cash equivalents to total expense, change in reserves, change in cash equivalents, and growth in short term liquidity to assets. There are four leverage series-change and growth in liabilities to assets, and change and growth in assets to capital.
There are four growth series-growth in total assets, growth in total liabilities, growth in deposits, and growth of the mismatch between assets and liabilities maturing in the next six months. There are four series reflecting the change in return-change in pre-and post-tax return on equity, and change in pre-and post-tax return on assets. There are four series reflecting the growth in securities-change and growth in securities available for sale, and the change and growth in securities to assets. There are three series associated with the growth in profitabilitygrowth in net interest margin, growth in revenue to assets, and growth in interest income to assets. There are four economic conditions series-inflation measured by personal consumption less energy and food, output measured by real GDP, money supply measured by M2, and the natural rate of unemployment.
Methods
We use cluster analysis of quarterly data to determine potential grouping of our population of banks into distinct tiers. 4 Cluster analysis is appropriate for such a study due to the assumption-neutral way it classifies observations. We employ the two-step methodology 4 It should be noted that usage of quarterly balance sheet data to partition the interbank market is suggested as a viable alternative by studies of transactional data. For example, after partitioning institutions according to their transactions for the German interbank market, Craig and Von Peter (2014) find that the membership of banks could be predicted reasonably well based purely upon aggregate reporting of bank size.
proposed by Chiu et al. (2001) which extends the BIRCH algorithm developed by Zhang et al. (1996) . The distance measure between two clusters (or observations) is related to the decrease in the log-likelihood function as they are combined into one cluster under the assumption that continuous variables and categorical variables follow the normal and multinomial distributions respectively. It is also assumed that variables and observations are independent. Appendix A in Supplements provides further mathematical details for cluster analysis.
We apply exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to investigate whether variables from the 30-item scale dataset of institutional balance sheets and macroeconomic conditions are adequately correlated and meet criteria of reliability and validity. Since EFA does not rely upon assumptions about how variables should be grouped, it is appropriate for an initial investigation of the effect that latent factors may exert on observable measures. Each factor "summarize[s] the interrelationships among [variables] in a concise but accurate manner as an aid in conceptualization" (Gorsuch, 1983: 2) . We allow the common factors to be correlated and include idiosyncratic behavior through observation errors. To support meaningful interpretation from this measurement model we require that the factors are: common across observations, invariant to interbank organization during measurement, and significantly explain interbank activity.
To better understand the primary drivers of interbank activity we seek causal interpretation (Pearl, 2012) through a latent factor model ) (see Supplements, Appendix B for further mathematical details). We specify a latent factor model drawing upon literature to explain interbank activity through a set of falsifiable hypotheses. This model includes factors that may have direct influence on interbank activity alongside factors with a potential indirect (mediated) influence. The measurement of factors is invariant; however, we allow interbank tiers to influence the strength and character of the estimated relationships among the model factors.
Hypothesis development
In this section, we build on current literature to develop a model of interbank activity wherein the change in leverage, change in return, and growth serve as measures of financial performance which mediate the effect of changes in liquidity and economic conditions on observable interbank activity. We develop three sets of testable hypotheses to address our research questions. First, the organization hypotheses (H1 and H2) examine the structure of the US interbank market. Second, the measurement model (H3), direct association (H4) and mediation hypotheses (H5 and H6) to connect economic conditions and bank specific factors to interbank market activity. Third, the moderation hypotheses (H8 -H11) examine the extent to which the model of interbank activity is affected by interbank market organization.
Interbank market organization
Several authors have studied the organization of interbank markets empirically. Craig and von Peter (2014) examine the organization of all institutions participating in the German interbank market using direct bilateral exposure data between Q1:1999 and Q4:2007. They posit the existence of a rule-defined core-periphery organization wherein core banks (small fraction of banks that borrow and lend) are assumed to trade between themselves and with the periphery.
The distinguishing feature of periphery banks is that they can only interact with core banks. 5 In a similar study of the US federal funds market, Bech and Atalay (2010) apply the Furfine (1999) methodology to infer bilateral exposures using data from April 1997 to Dec. 2006. They propose 5 Craig and von Peter (2014) find significant improvement upon Erdos-Renyi and scale-free networks and are able to generalize their method to consider a K-tier organizational scheme. For the German interbank system they find a 17% error rate in network link identification for 3 tiers compared to 12% for 2 tiers.
the existence of five groups, which trade according to several rules. 6 Unsurprisingly, the structural changes in the interbank market lead to alternative views of the US interbank market organization. 7 One persistent view of the US interbank market since the late 1980s is a three-tier organization (Allen and Saunders, 1986; Stigum and Crescenzi, 2007) . Allen and Saunders (1986) differentiate the tiers as primary interdealer market banks, intermediary correspondents, and smaller banks lacking direct access to the primary market. Based on extensive interviews with market participants, Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) describe the interbank market in terms of money center banks, regional banks, and smaller banks. The three alternative models of interbank organization-core-periphery, five-group, and three-tier-are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
It is reasonable to expect that our dataset of the top 100 BHCs filters out the disconnected group with 1% of all participants (Bech and Atalay, 2010) . Reconsidering Bech and Atalay (2010) findings (with the omission of transaction directionality but recognizing net transaction activity), the US interbank market may be represented as a core-periphery organization consistent with Craig and von Peter (2014) . In this representation, the core component is likely coincident with the GSCC group (Bech and Atalay, 2010) , while the periphery component is likely coincident with the combined GIN, GOUT, and Tendrils groups. Alternatively, the US interbank organization may be represented as a three-tier organization consistent with Allen and 6 The giant strongly connected component (GSCC) composed of nodes that are connected to every other node in the GSCC through a directed path: the giant in-component (GIN) (resp. giant out-component (GOUT)) with nodes connected to the GSCC by a directed path in but not out (resp. from but not to) the GSCC; the tendrils that are connected to the GSCC only through a path of mixed lending and borrowing links; and the disconnected component with nodes, which participate in the federal funds market but are completely disconnected from the GSCC. Bech and Atalay (2010: 12-14) find the following allocation of institutions among the five groups: GSCC=10% (±1%), G-IN=58% (±5%), G-OUT=17% (±4%), Tendrils=14% (±3%); such that ~7.2% were borrowing from GIN, ~4.8% were lending to GOUT, and ~2.3% of tendrils were borrowing from GIN and lending to GOUT. The disconnected component contained less than 1% (±1%) of institutions. 7 Furfine (1999) , Soramaki et al. (2007) , and Battiston et al. (2012) have also considered multi-tiered systems. Saunders (1986) and Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) , where the GSCC group is likely coincident with tier 1, while GIN, GOUT, and Tendrils (differentiate by interbank activity share) form tiers 2 and 3.
Exploratory analysis of characteristics of interbank market participants suggests that market organization exists as a latent construct that can be measured using relevant characteristics of financial intermediaries: interbank lending, interbank borrowing, interbank pass-through, 8 rank, and total assets. To establish the validity of this construct the institutional characteristics must both reliably converge on the latent construct (convergent validity) and be mutually distinct (discriminant validity) (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) .
Hypothesis 1 (H1)
. A construct of core-periphery interbank market organization is formed by the five indicators of interbank lending, interbank borrowing, interbank pass-through, rank, and assets, such that the silhouette measure of cohesion and separation 9 exceeds 0.5.
10
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A construct of three-tiered interbank market organization is formed by the five indicators of interbank lending, interbank borrowing, interbank pass-through, rank, and assets, such that the silhouette measure of cohesion and separation exceeds 0.5.
Formation of measurement, direct association, and mediation hypotheses
Measurement model hypotheses.
"Contemporary banking theory classifies banking functions into four main categories:
offering liquidity and payment services, transforming assets, managing risks, processing information and monitoring" (Freixas and Rochet, 2008: 2) . We consider the collected 30-item dataset in terms of these four functional categories. The risk management function reflects
8
The interbank pass-through value is defined as the minimum of interbank borrowing and lending at quarterly time . It measures the institution's role as a conduit of funding.
9
See Rousseeuw (1987) .
10
See changing economic conditions, which may be handled through adjustment of the growth in securities, the change in leverage, the change in return, and profitability growth. The change in liquidity factor reflects the larger liquidity provision function. The growth factor reflects the larger asset transformation function. Information processing and monitoring may not be observable in the collected dataset.
We propose that seven latent factors of economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, growth, growth in securities, and profitability growth reliably measure the variance of our sample dataset. Accordingly, these seven latent factors should possess high correlation within each factor, low correlation between factors, and be consistently measured across all market participants. See . More detailed discussion of test statistics is provided in Section 4.2.
Hypothesis 3 (H3a
Direct association hypotheses.
We consider the direct effect that a change in monetary policy, economic conditions, leverage, liquidity, overall growth, or return would have upon interbank activity through three perspectives: 1) financial intermediation as delegated monitoring, 2) bank portfolio management, and 3) bank funding. First, interbank participants cross-monitor counterparty liquidity, leverage, return, and growth to inform pricing and collateral margins relative to economic conditions (Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Freixas and Rochet, 2008) . Second, portfolio management determines the leverage banks use, the liquidity risk exposure, and the return banks eventually realize dependent on economic conditions (Farrugia et al., 2011; Moshirian and Wu, 2012; Bagliano and Morana, 2014) . Portfolio management is generally considered a fundamental behavior of financial intermediaries (e.g. Hart and Jaffee, 1974; Koehn and Santomero, 1980) . 12 From the third (funding) perspective, banks "finance their assets with interbank funds" (Rochet and Vives, 2004: 1117) and pledge assets as collateral in the interbank market (Freixas et al., 2004; Brunnermeier, 2009) . 13 Thus, we make the simplifying hypothesis that direct associations between economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, growth and interbank activity are consistent with literature.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). At 95% confidence, the latent factors of economic conditions (H4a), change in liquidity (H4b), change in leverage (H4c), change in return (H4d), and growth (H4e), in addition to monetary policy (H4f) are significantly associated with interbank borrowing.
12
From this perspective, the extant banks can be viewed as successful portfolio managers, taking exogenous flows and choosing a return and growth rate "to maximize the expectation… of the bank's financial net worth" (Rochet, 1992 (Rochet, : 1139 .
13
See also Heider et al., (2008: 2) who show how "banks' asset risks affects funding liquidity in the interbank market" in addition to Acharya and Skeie (2011) who study the effect that leverage of a bank has on its access to the interbank market in the presence of adverse economic conditions reflected by low market liquidity.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). At 95% confidence, the latent factors of economic conditions (H5a), change in liquidity (H5b), change in leverage (H5c), change in return (H5d), and growth (H5e), in addition to monetary policy (H5f) are significantly associated with interbank lending.
Mediation hypotheses.
Empirical studies of Goldsmith (1969) , McKinnon (1973) , Shaw (1973) , and King and Levine (1993) find a positive association between economic growth and financial development. Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) consider interbank activity as insurance against changes in returns and liquidity. Holmström and Tirole (2001) model assets as cushion against liquidity shocks that condition interbank activity. Heider et al. (2008) find that variation in economic conditions affects interbank activity through risk in counterparty assets. The financial accelerator effect (Bernanke et al., 1999 ) also plays a role in the connection between macroeconomic conditions and banking through the mediating influence of banks' balance sheets. Specifically, "as balance sheets strengthen with improved economic conditions, the external finance problem declines, which works to enhance borrower spending, thus enhancing the boom. … In this framework, a crisis is a situation where balance sheets of borrowers deteriorate sharply, possibly associated with a sharp deterioration in asset prices, causing the external finance premium to jump … [creating] strains in the interbank market" (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010) . Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2006) and Chiabi and Ftiti (2014) find that economic conditions and leverage significantly impact return; through which they may in turn indirectly influence interbank positions. Finally, economic conditions are typically addressed by policy makers through monetary policy instruments such as the federal funds rate which acts as the reference price of much interbank activity (Stigum, 1989) . Thus, both theoretical and empirical literature support the parsimonious view of monetary policy, growth, change in return, and change in leverage as mediators of economic conditions, changes in liquidity, changes in leverage, and changes in return, and their effect on interbank activity.
14 Hypothesis 6 (H6). At 95% confidence, the relationships of economic conditions (H6a), change in liquidity (H6b), change in leverage (H6c), and change in return (H6d) with interbank borrowing are mediated by the changes in leverage, change in return, growth, and monetary policy.
Hypothesis 7 (H7). At 95% confidence, the relationships of economic conditions (H7a), change in liquidity (H7b), change in leverage (H7c), and change in return (H7d) with interbank lending are mediated by changes in leverage, change in return, growth, and monetary policy.
Formation of moderation hypotheses: Multi-group boundary conditions
Multi-group structural variance.
A number of studies (Allen and Saunders, 1986; Allen et al., 1989; King, 2008; Ashcraft et al., 2011) find that interbank market activity varies with interbank market organization. Allen et al. (1989: 502-503 ) mention three ways size may impact bank participation in the interbank market.
First, Allen and Saunders (1986) See also Pagano (1993) , Coccorese (2004) , and Baum et al. (2009). to differentiated discount window rate, 15 many authors argue that money center banks benefit from implicit preferential liquidity backstop, a form of too-big-to-fail insurance by the Central Bank (e.g., Freixas et al., 2000: 627) .
Second, Ho and Saunders (1985) propose that "managers of smaller regional banks may choose to rely on traditional "deposit-taking" techniques of funds production for reasons of risk aversion." An alternative is that due to a lack of competition smaller banks may serve regions in which they are able to collect deposits at below market rates (Rose and Kolari, 1985; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988) . 16 Geographic expansion can be expected to pressure the expanding small banks to offer uniform rates across their branches, thus reducing their local deposit funding advantage and increasing the cost effectiveness of borrowing in the interbank market.
Third, Ashcraft et al. (2011: 26) build a model for intraday activity in the interbank market, according to which "Smaller banks hold larger average scaled amounts of nonborrowed reserves overnight than do large banks." Their model implies that small banks due to their relatively larger reserve balances will in general have weaker relationships with interbank borrowing and lending than large banks.
Therefore, we propose that the latent factor model relating economic conditions, the change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, and growth with interbank activity will vary significantly by market organization (hypothesis 8). Moreover, the theoretical and empirical studies above suggest that interbank market organization creates stronger association between the latent factors and interbank activity for money center banks than for smaller institutions (hypotheses 9 and 10).
15
The Federal Reserve Discount Window offers short-term credit at the prime or secondary rates, both above the federal funds rate.
16
See Freixas and Rochet (2008: 81-84) and Salop (1979) .
Hypothesis 8 (H8)
. At 95% confidence, the structural model of relationships of economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, and growth as they relate to interbank borrowing and lending activity is variant, such that there is a statistically significant difference in the latent factor model relationships between the interbank market structural groups.
Hypothesis 9 (H9). Interbank market organization will moderate the strength of the direct and mediated relationships between economic conditions (H9a), the change in liquidity (H9b), the change in leverage (H9c), the change in return (H9d), growth (H9e), and monetary policy (H9f) with interbank borrowing, such that the relationship will be stronger for lower Tiers (Tier 1 stronger than Tier2 which is in turn stronger than Tier 3, or Core stronger than Periphery).
Hypothesis 10 (H10). Interbank market organization will moderate the strength of the direct and mediated relationships between economic conditions (H10a), the change in liquidity (H10b), the change in leverage (H10c), the change in return (H10d), growth (H10e), and monetary policy (H9f) with interbank lending, such that the relationship will be stronger for lower Tier (Tier 1 stronger than Tier2 stronger than Tier 3, or Core stronger than Periphery).
Alternative interbank market organizations.
The dominant findings in recent literature suggest that the core-periphery organization found for the German interbank market by Craig and von Peter (2014) may be pervasive. The core-periphery organization has been verified as a "stylized fact of interbank markets" in Netherlands (in 't Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014: 27) , UK (Langfield and Ota, 2014) , and Italy (Fricke and Lux, 2014) . At the same time, the authors find some room for alternative representations and acknowledge the common limitations of their network analysis. Langfield and Ota (2014) state "that the UK interbank market closely approximates a core-periphery organization, but that the closeness of this approximation, and the composition of the optimal core, changes significantly across market instruments." Similarly, in 't Veld and van Lelyveld (2014) acknowledge that "While the core has a higher average size than the periphery, we observe that the group of core banks can be divided in the small set of the largest banks, and an additional group of medium-sized banks of a size similar to many periphery banks." Given the support for the core-periphery interpretation of the European interbank markets, we hypothesize that the core-periphery organization will also allow a superior explanation of the US interbank market than the alternative three-tier model observed.
Hypothesis 11 (H11). Core-periphery structural moderation is superior to three-tier structural moderation of the latent factor model relating economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, and growth to interbank activity, demonstrated by the sample multivariate goodness-of-fit statistics.
Results
Interbank market tiering
Propositions H1 and H2 are tested and supported by the silhouette measure of cohesion and separation (SMCS) value of 0.5298 for the core-periphery organization and SMCS of 0.5469 for the three-tier organization respectively, decomposed by the variables used for cluster analysis and discussed in Supplements (Appendix A). Descriptive statistics for total assets, asset ranking, interbank borrowing, interbank lending, and interbank pass-through are provided in Table 1 .
Measurement, direct association, and mediation
Structure in variable data.
Hypothesis H3 requires that seven distinct factors of the change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, growth, growth in securities, profitability growth and economic conditions adequately describe variation in our dataset. We test this through EFA using IBM SPSS Statistics software, then by examining overall model and multi-group fit through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in IBM SPSS AMOS.
EFA using principal component extraction, Promax rotation, and Kaiser normalization supports the identification of seven distinct factors among the observed items (pattern matrix for factors is provided in Supplements, Appendix B). Further support for H3a, correlative validity of the identified factors, is provided by examining the correlation matrix organized by factors.
Items that load onto a particular factor should correlate strongly with each other, while correlations with other factors' loadings should not be strong. Visual examination of Table 2 supports the convergent validity of the factor definitions, evidenced by strong correlations among items that are expected to load distinctly into unique factors. Discriminant validity of the factor definitions is also supported, since fewer than 10% of all items exhibit medium-size (0.2 to 0.5 range) correlations. Table 2 about here
The EFA results are used to set up a first order CFA measurement model. Formal tests for reliability (H3b), convergent validity (H3c), discriminant validity (H3d), and measurement model invariance (H3e) are discussed below.
The reliability of each factor is supported by a Cronbach Alpha (CA) statistic 17 satisfying the 0.7 threshold (Peterson and Kim, 2013) in Table 3 . The composite reliability for factor F ( ), a measure of aggregate factor reliability, following Fornell and Larcker (1981) is defined according to equation (1) where is the loading of component , and 2 is the variance of the measurement error of component . Bagozzi and Yi (1988) suggest 0.7 as an adequate threshold for . We test for convergent validity, defined by Krippendorff (2012) as the "extent to which results correlate with variables known to measure the same phenomena and considered valid", using the Average Variance Extracted of factor F ( ) following equation (2). Convergent validity is supported if is greater than 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) and if is greater than (Byrne, 2013) . We analyze the discriminant validity, the idea that the variances of latent factor F and any other sample do not overlap, through the Maximum Shared Variance ( ) and the Average Shared Variance of factor F ( ), following equations (3) and (4) respectively. The hypothesis test criteria that is greater than , and is greater than can be found in .
17 Cronbach Alpha (CA) statistic of factor reliability is measured as =
where 2 is variance of individual factor items and 2 is the factor variance (e.g., Crocker & Algina, 1986 ).
In Table 3 we show that the composite reliability metrics for each factor are well above the threshold of 0.7 required, supporting factor reliability (H3b). The average variance extracted is between 0.5 and the composite reliability for each factor which supports convergent validity (H3c). Furthermore, we find that the average variance extracted is greater than both the maximum shared variance and the average shared variance for each factor supporting the discriminant validity of the latent factors (H3d). Table 3 about here
we consider the configural invariance for the measurement model by comparing its goodness of fit statistics in the context of the model's multi-group partitions, as summarized in Table 4 . state that "One key point across the results is that simpler models and smaller samples should be subject to more strict evaluation than are more complex models with larger samples." The measurement model in this study satisfies both the complexity (30 variables and 7 factors) and large sample size (over 6000 observations) considerations. The comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) decreases when the sample is partitioned along either the coreperiphery or three-tier interbank market organization, and in each case it fails to meet the 0.9 threshold suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999) . The root-mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger & Lind, 1980 ) metrics for each model are close or satisfy (for the three-tier model) the 0.1 threshold suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999) . Finally, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) is close to but does not meet the 0.05 threshold suggested by Byrne (2013) for well-fitting models.
18 Allowing for flexibility when determining adequate thresholds for the goodness-of-fit statistics due to model complexity and the large sample size,
18
The 2 / metric is not considered since Satorra and Bentler (2001) find that it is sensitive to non-normal data which is present in this dataset.
we suggest that the CFA measurement model is close but does not support configural invariance.
However, as an alternative to configural invariance we test for and are able to support metric invariance following 2014) thereby satisfying hypothesis H3e (Supplements, Appendix B).
Insert Table 4 about here
We test the direct association of the five latent factors and monetary policy with interbank borrowing and interbank lending through a straightforward estimation of the structural equation model presented in Fig. 2 (Panel A) using the entire sample. Table 5 indicates that several portions of hypotheses 4 and 5 are supported, particularly the significance of return, growth, and economic conditions. Table 5 about here
We test the mediation relationships proposed in hypotheses 6 and 7 using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach (estimating the model without and then with mediators) which are illustrated in Fig. 2 Panel B. Results are provided in Table 6 . Mediation hypotheses are tested via bootstrapping (2000 samples with 95% bias-corrected confidence level). We find that hypotheses 5 and 6 are both supported for several relationships; however, the nature of intermediation varies. Table 6 about here
Moderation
Moderation of interbank market organization.
We incorporate the interbank market organization as a consideration of interbank activity in the latent factor model described in Fig. 2 . We test for significant differences in model coefficients between groups using the 2 test with 0 expecting model invariance. The results are presented in Table 7 . There is significant difference in the chi-squared values between constrained and unconstrained versions of the model for both the core-periphery and three-tier interbank market organizations supporting hypothesis 8. In Table 8 we explore the moderation of direct relationships and find significant evidence in support of moderation for several direct relationships. The results of testing moderation for the mediated relationships are detailed in Supplements, Appendix B3. Table 7 about here Table 8 about here
Comparison of alternative interbank market organizations.
Motivated by the desire for a better structural representation of the interbank market, we attempt to determine which decomposition of the interbank market is a more useful. To this end we compare the goodness of fit for the latent factor model presented in Fig. 2 Panel B for individual partitions of the interbank market and provide the results in Table 9 . Model fit is best when all observations are included simultaneously. This is not surprising, since the latent factor model was selected to optimize the model fit for the entire sample. Interestingly, the fit of each segment of the three-tier model is superior to any segment of the core-periphery model. Tier 2 appears to behave significantly differently from tiers 1 and 3.
19 Therefore, a possible cause of the decrease in model fit is that the core and periphery each contain portions of tier 2 which behaves distinctly. This result must be taken with some discretion, since it is also natural to expect that a model which allows calibration with more groups may achieve a better fit. Table 9 about here
This study combines two distinct strands of literature which investigate the organization of the interbank market and the determinants of institutions' interbank activity. In contrast to prior studies of interbank market organization that focus on transactional data to connect specific borrowers and lenders, this paper utilizes aggregate institutional activity in the collateralized interbank market. Cluster analysis of bank data leads to competing evidence of core-periphery and three-tier market organizations.
Our second empirical finding is that five latent factors, as hypothesized, explain the variance in the interbank activity data across tiers. Specifically, three factors-economic conditions, change in return, and balance sheet growth-are significantly and directly associated with interbank activity. In addition, two factors-change in liquidity and change in leveragehave a mediated relationship with interbank activity via growth and change in return. Moreover, we find that interbank market organization significantly moderates interbank activity.
To determine whether the core-periphery partition, proposed for several European countries, is superior to the three-tier partition as an organizational representation of the US collateralized interbank market, we first examine whether the moderating effect of these 19 The distinct behavior of Tier 2 can be seen in Table 8 through the coefficient difference tests in Panel B. Also, in Appendix B we test for the moderation of mediated relationships and find that the three-tier organization recognizes less moderation of mediated relationships than the core-periphery organization. alternative organizations is reasonable and useful for interpretation. Second, we analyze which organization achieves superior model fit in explaining the variance in the interbank market activities. Contrary to the literature findings in the European interbank markets, we find that the three-tier organization marginally outperforms the core-periphery organization in explaining the US collateralized interbank market activity largely by capturing the distinct behavior of tier 2 compared to tiers 1 and 3.
Supplements
Supplementary data in Appendixes A, B, and C can be found in the online version of the article. (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) Table 5 Direct association results.
Table 7
Invariance to interbank market organization (H8). Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The distance between clusters and is defined as 20 : , which would result in the natural logarithm being undefined. 21 The result of this cluster analysis is that each observation is assigned to one of M tiers, denoted ( ) ∈ {1, … , } where m is a membership function.
We measure the goodness of the predicted tier membership produced by the cluster analysis in terms of the average silhouette coefficient . The latter balances the desire for each observation in a cluster to be "close" to the other observations in that cluster (similarity within a cluster) against the need for an observation to be "distant" from observations which are not in that cluster (distinction between clusters). It is calculated as:
The distance measure proposed by Chiu et al. (2001) also allows for the use of categorical variables which is slightly more involved and therefore a simpler version is outlined here.
21
Initially, each cluster contains only a single observation leading to a variance of zero for that cluster which would make the logarithm term undefined if � 2 was not included.
ii
where ( , ) is the distance between observations and and ( ) denotes the centroid of the cluster to which observation belongs. find that a silhouette greater than 0.5 indicates reasonable partitioning while a silhouette less than 0.2 implies that the dataset does not exhibit a cluster structure.
A2. Data suitability and results.
Hair et al. (2010) point out that not every dataset is appropriate for cluster analysis and propose three features that suitable data should possess. First, "variables with larger dispersion (i.e., larger standard deviation) have more impact on the final similarity value" so the scale of variables should be similar. Therefore, we convert each observation of interbank lending, interbank borrowing, interbank pass-through, and total assets to reflect the share of that variable controlled at that time. 22 Second, point out that there is no statistical basis to infer the properties of a large population from a small sample so the sample should adequately represent the population. Our dataset of the 100 largest banks accounts for 90% of assets as well as 95% of the interbank activity reported by the 900 largest bank holding companies between 2013 and 2014 supporting the representativeness of our sample. 23 Third, multicollinearity in the data may bias the classification towards one concept over the others. We are not attempting to cluster around several competing traits (e.g. interbank activity, risk profile, geographic presence) so any multicollinearity present should not severely impair the procedure.
22
The asset (size-based) ranking is not transformed to a share basis due to its ordinal nature. However, the asset ranking is standardized which places it at the same scale as other variables.
23
Due to the method of tracing back a firm through time our sample may become progressively less representative as we move backwards historically.
iii Finally, while clustering methods based on Euclidean distance measures do not make assumptions about the distributions of underlying variables, the log-likelihood measure of distance described in Section 2 assumes normality for all continuous variables. Therefore, a logarithmic transformation is applied to the data restoring moderately acceptable skewness and kurtosis values. To avoid complications with the logarithmic transformation for banks which do not participate as lenders and borrowers in a given period we add a very small value to the lending and borrowing positions of each observation. The standardized versions of these logarithmic and share transformed variables are used in cluster analysis. Descriptive statistics for the data are provided for the entire sample in Table 1 and by market segment in Table A1 . Following , we set up a factor model to estimate the factors collectively.
Given observable variables and , our objective is to estimate the coefficient matrices ∈ ℝ × , ∈ ℝ × , and η ∈ ℝ × in the below equation
Here ∈ ℝ is a vector of control variables and ∈ ℝ is a zero mean disturbance term which is assumed to be uncorrelated with , , and . The exogenous and endogenous latent factor vectors, and respectively, are estimated using the system of equations below
In above equations, X ∈ ℝ q and Y ∈ ℝ p are observed variables from the sample panel dataset. Λ x ∈ ℝ q×n and Λ y ∈ ℝ p×m are the given coefficient matrices describing the respective relationships of X to Ξ and of Y to Η .The measurement errors for X, Y, and H are given by vectors Δ, Ε , and Ζ respectively. They are assumed to be zero mean and uncorrelated with the systematic factors Ξ, Η, and each other. The coefficient matrix B ∈ ℝ m×m shows the effect of endogenous variables on each other such that (I − B) is nonsingular. The coefficient matrix Γ ∈ ℝ m×n specifies the dependence of Η on exogenous latent factors Ξ. We estimate Ξ and Η by 25
In the model implementation, Q contains a vector of institutional interbank borrowing and lending (relative to assets) and K controls for the monetary policy via effective federal funds rate. The exogenous latent factors are economic conditions and the change in liquidity, while the endogenous latent factors include the change in leverage, change in return, and growth.
vi using the maximum likelihood method which minimizes the distance function between the sample and the factor covariance matrices.
Robustness.
The EFA model's core assumptions include that factors and , as well as idiosyncratic residuals and do not exhibit serial correlation. Referring to the assumption of serial correlation, Geweke (1977: 365) raises the point that "if the ( ) are time series this assumption is almost always inappropriate since ( ) and ( + ) will in general be correlated." Stock and Watson (2011: 2) provide the analogy that residuals pick up on issues unique to an individual indicator, like the impact of a salmonella scare which affects restaurant employment but not the pet store next door. Anderson (1963: 7) agrees that shocks in the time dimension may persist across multiple time periods leading to serial correlation issues. However, Anderson concludes that the "day-to-day correlation may be of no greater disadvantage than if the observations were independent". As shown in Table B1 , serial correlation testing on the time-ordered data showed the presence of some serial correlation. Table B2 indicates that the data significantly differs from the normal distribution. Descriptive statistics for each data series analyzed in EFA is provided in Table B3 . 
B2. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.
The pattern matrix in Table B4 demonstrates consistently high loadings between each factor and relevant variables in addition to no cross-loading. The results provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 3 for the presence of factors which incorporate variables of economic conditions, change in liquidity, change in leverage, change in return, growth, growth in securities, and profitability growth. We then construct and solve the corresponding first order measurement model in IBM SPSS AMOS using maximum likelihood estimation. It is important that the factors are estimated consistently for a given partition of the sample, so that each factor can be measured invariantly across interbank characteristics. Following 2014) , metric invariance requires that the loading of at least one variable for each factor does not significantly vary across subsamples. We establish metric invariance in Table B5 where grayed cells indicate stable loadings across interbank market segments.
ix x Table B5 Metric invariance of the factor model with respect to interbank market organization (H3e).
B3. Moderated mediation.
Following Hypotheses 9 and 10, we expect to find differences in how factors indirectly contribute to interbank positions. Therefore, we investigate whether interbank market organization moderates the mediating relationship that change in leverage, change in return, growth, and monetary policy exert on relationships with interbank borrowing and lending. This is undertaken by estimating the nature of mediation for each segment in isolation and comparing these to determine changes in the nature, significance, and direction of association. Results are presented in Tables B6 and B7 for core-periphery and three-tier organizations respectively. We find that the three-tier interbank market organization moderates the mediating role of:
-growth between liquidity and borrowing, -growth between leverage and borrowing/lending, -change in return between leverage and lending.
However, the core-periphery interbank market organization moderates the mediating role of:
-growth between liquidity and borrowing as well as lending, -change in return between leverage and lending, -growth between leverage and borrowing/lending, -growth between change in return and borrowing/lending.
Many of these moderating influences that are significant from the core-periphery perspective fail to be significant from the three-tier perspective. These results suggest that the core-periphery organization, by not recognizing the distinct behavior of tier 2, finds moderated relationships that may not be truly present.
xii Change in Return ↗ Growth ↗ Interbank lending -0.168*** -0.168*** 0.000 NM 0.007 0.007 -0.002*** FM Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% There is either no mediation (NM), full mediation (FM), or partial mediation (PM) for each relationship.
xiii Table B7 Multi-group moderation using the three-tier organization. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% There is either no mediation (NM), full mediation (FM), or partial mediation (PM) for each relationship.
